The Americans with Disabilities Act and Reasonable Accommodations

The Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) was enacted into law by Congress in 1990. Title I of the ADA prevents employers from discriminating against a person with a disability, on the basis of that disability, with respect to job application procedures, hiring, advancement, discharge, compensation and other terms or conditions of employment. In 2008, after a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions narrowed the definition of a “disability” so as to significantly limit the scope of the ADA, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act. The purpose of the ADAAA was to broaden the definition of “disability” and thus provide coverage to a wider group of individuals.

The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the “major life activities” of such individual. “Major life activities” include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating and working.

The ADA requires an employer with 15 or more employees to provide “reasonable accommodation” for individuals with disabilities. A “reasonable accommodation” is any change in the work environment, or in the way things are customarily done, that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities. A reasonable accommodation need not be provided if it would impose an “undue hardship” on the operation of the business of the employer. However, an employer may not refuse to provide an accommodation just because it involves some cost. Examples of reasonable accommodations include the following:

› making existing facilities accessible;
› part-time or modified work schedules;
› reassignment to a vacant position
› acquiring or modifying equipment; and
› changing tests, training materials, or policies.

A Summary Explanation of the Doctrine of Charitable Immunity

Charitable immunity is perhaps one of the most misunderstood concepts in the law. Many charities are under the mistaken assumption that they are immune from any lawsuit simply because they operate as a non-profit and for a charitable purpose. This is a misunderstanding that can have unfortunate consequences.

In Virginia, “[a] charitable institution is immune from liability to its beneficiaries for [ordinary] negligence arising from acts of its servants and agents, but only if due care has been exercised in their selection and retention.” Ola v. YMCA of South Hampton Roads, Inc., 270 Va. 550 (2005). This statement obviously merits further analysis.

First, in order to obtain charitable immunity, the organization must be a charitable institution. To determine whether an institution is charitable, Virginia courts “apply a two-part test, examining (1) whether the organization’s articles of incorporation have a charitable or eleemosynary purpose and (2) whether the organization is in fact operated consistent with that purpose.” Davidson v. The Colonial Williamsburg Found., 817 F.Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1993). It is therefore imperative that non-profit organizations operating as charitable or public benefit organizations not only draft articles of incorporation that reflect their mission, but that they also operate in a manner wholly consistent with that mission.

Second, a charitable institution is immune from liability only to its beneficiaries. In Virginia, charities are not immune from liability to legal strangers. A beneficiary is someone that receives something of value, which the organization, through its charitable purposes, undertakes to provide. Egerton v. R.E. Lee Memorial Church, 395 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1968). As an example, the recipient of an in-home meal from a charity providing in-home meals to the sick or disabled would be considered a beneficiary of the organization’s charitable purpose. However, the victim of an automobile accident occurring on the roads while the same charity was delivering a meal would not be a beneficiary.

Non-compete Provision - Revisited and Reversed by Virginia Supreme Court

On November 4, 2011, the Virginia Supreme Court issued an important opinion on the enforceability of non-compete agreements in Virginia. In Home Paramount Pest Control Companies, Inc. v. Shaffer, et al., the Supreme Court affirmed the Fairfax County Circuit Court's prior determination that a non-compete provision in a former employee's employment agreement was overbroad and, therefore, unenforceable.

In 1989, in a case involving the same employer, the Supreme Court ruled that an identical provision in an employment agreement was enforceable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed its previous stance, demonstrating the shift in the law that has occurred over the last 22 years. The Supreme Court justified its decision on the basis of several other cases that have been decided since 1989, which cases clarified the law and created the framework from which the 2011 case was decided.

The Supreme Court explained that non-compete provisions are only enforceable if they are narrowly drawn to protect the employer's legitimate business interest, are not unreasonably burdensome on an employee's ability to earn a livelihood and are not against public policy. The employer bears the burden of proving each of these factors. Virginia Courts will consider the function, geographic scope and duration elements of the non-compete when evaluating whether the employer has met its burden. In assessing the "function" element, a Virginia Court will determine whether the prohibited activity is of the same type as that actually engaged in by the former employee while employed by the employer.