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Monday, September 16, 2019

Reckless Driving by Speed in Northern Virginia | Fairfax Virginia | GRDD Law

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If you receive a DWI in Northern Virginia, please contact us at 703-273-1400 or info@grddlaw.com.

Hello, my name is Jeffrey romantic and I’m a partner at the law firm of Gross & Romanick the law firm is located in Fairfax Virginia and a gross & Romanick.

I managed a criminal practice now one of the charges that I provide representation to clients on frequently is the charge of reckless driving by speed in Virginia. If you’re traveling in excess of 20 miles per hour over the speed limit or in excess of 80 miles per hour regardless of the speed you can be charged with reckless driving by speed.

Monday, September 2, 2019

Jeffrey Romanick on DWI | Fairfax Virginia

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If you receive a DWI in Northern Virginia, please contact us at 703-273-1400 or info@grddlaw.com.

Hello, my name is Jeffrey romantic and I’m a partner at the law firm of / us and romantic course romantic is located in Fairfax Virginia at gross romantic. I managed the criminal practice and a substantial portion of my practice is dedicated to representing individuals who’ve been charged with drunk driving in Northern Virginia as in much of the United States.

Friday, August 30, 2019

How to Defend Reckless Driving in Virginia


Jeffrey Romanick, Principal, and lawyer of the Fairfax Law Firm Gross & Romanick, P.C., discusses representation on the charge of Reckless Driving focusing on Speeding and the Northern Virginia Courts.

Reckless Driving in Virginia is a criminal charge. In Virginia, if you drive in excess of 20mph over the speed limit or over 80mph regardless of the speed limit, you can be charged with Reckless Driving.

Wednesday, August 28, 2019

How to Defend DWI in Virginia, Fairfax


Jeffrey Romanick, Principal and lawyer of the Fairfax Law Firm Gross, Romanick, Dean & DeSimone, P.C., discusses the charge of DWI and the process of defending and preparing for Court in Northern Virginia.

If you have been charged with drunk driving, a knowledgeable, experienced lawyer will engage in three tasks to help you. First the lawyer will analyze the legal case; next, the lawyer will prepare you for your day in Court; and, third, the lawyer will fight for you at the Courthouse.

Wednesday, August 21, 2019

How Do You Defend a High BAC Charge? | Fairfax, Virginia | Gross, Romanick, Dean & DeSimone, P.C.


GRDD Law Partner Ash Dean Discusses How To Defend Against A High BAC (Blood Alcohol Content) Charge In Northern Virginia. Reckless Driving in Virginia is a criminal charge. In Virginia, if you drive in excess of 20 mph over the speed limit or over 80 mph regardless of the speed limit, you can be charged with Reckless Driving. The charge is a Class 1 Misdemeanor with potential for jail time, license suspension, and very high fines. A conviction will impact future insurance premiums and may show up in an employment background check. A conviction may have to be disclosed on a college application. A conviction can also affect your ability to obtain and retain a security clearance from the federal government.

Wednesday, September 28, 2016

Does an Employer Have the Right to Access an Employee’s Personal E-mail Account to Review Work-Related Emails?

In Virginia, it is settled that an employer can legally monitor and review e-mails of an employee communicated through the employer’s e-mail server or e-mail accounts.  It is also settled that an employer can legally monitor and review any personal communications that are stored on company-owned equipment, such as computers and cellphones. In both scenarios, the courts have ruled that employees have no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to such communications. It is less settled whether an employer can legally review work-related e-mails sent or received by an employee through a personal e-mail account.

A recent case out of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia tackled this very issue.  In the case of Hoofnagle v. Smyth-Wythe Airport Commission, et al., the plaintiff alleged that his employer violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701, et al.) when, after his employment was terminated, the employer accessed his e-mail account to review work-related e-mails. The plaintiff had been employed as the manager of a small regional airport. Since his employer did not maintain any e-mail accounts for its business, the plaintiff created a Yahoo! e-mail account that he used for both business and personal purposes. He was terminated after sending the following e-mail to Senator Timothy Kaine:

Dear, Mr. Kain [sic]. I own over 9 AR platform rifles and 30 some various other rifles and shotguns, a dozen handguns, I suggest you stick up for rights of all gun owners in Va. In my opinion you and your kind (Liberals) ARE a CANCER to this state and COUNTRY, therefore I have gone to the voting polls every Nov. to try and eradicate you and your kind from public office, and will continue to do so. We do not have a gun problem, We have an IDIOT PROBLEM, go deal with that, and not the competent gun owner. Here is the Va. NRA tollfree # 1-800-672-3888. Now you can join the NRA. So you can be apart [sic] of something with some substance and character…Charles H. Hoofnagle. Airport Operations Manager Mt. Empire Airport in south west Va. 276-685-1122 

In response to the lawsuit, the employer filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted as to the Fourth Amendment claim (since the search was deemed reasonable), but denied as to the Stored Communications Act (SCA) claim. The Court opined that e-mails stored on the server of an internet service provider (ISP) like Yahoo! are subject to the SCA, and that if the employer accessed the e-mails by directly logging into the ISP website without the authorization of the employee, then such action would constitute a violation of the SCA (regardless of whether the employee used the employer’s computer to send the communications). By denying the employer’s motion for summary judgment, the Court allowed the plaintiff to pursue the SCA claim through trial, with the trial issue clearly being: did the employee give the account password to his employer, thereby authorizing access? The court did conclude that if the e-mail communications had been stored on a work computer, as opposed to on the ISP server, then the e-mails would not have been protected by the SCA. 

This case illustrates that it is important for employers to adopt a technology policy that expressly communicates to each employee, at a minimum, that: (a) the employer is authorized to monitor all work-related emails; (b) the employee has no expectation of privacy in work-related e-mails; (c) the employee has no expectation of privacy in materials stored on employer-owned equipment; (d) the employee shall not access personal e-mail accounts from employer-owned equipment; and (e) the employee shall not send work-related e-mails from personal e-mail accounts. This case also illustrates that it is important for employers to issue business e-mail accounts to all employees, and to require employees to provide account passwords.

The attorneys at Gross & Romanick, P.C. have substantial experience drafting employee handbooks and related policies designed to protect business owners.

Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 Can Protect Your Business

On May 11, 2016, President Obama signed the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”), which statute went into effect immediately. Virginia and most other states have existing laws against misappropriation of trade secrets, many adopting versions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). These laws allow businesses to seek redress for misappropriation of trade secrets in a state court venue, which can be procedurally problematic when the offending party has no connection to the applicable state.  The DTSA creates a civil cause of action under federal law, which now allows businesses to prosecute trade secret cases in federal court against individuals and businesses located in other states.  In addition, the DTSA specifically covers trade secret misappropriation that occurs overseas. 

The DTSA provides various remedies for the aggrieved business, including recovery of actual damages, recover of damages for unjust enrichment, recovery of exemplary damages (two times proven actual damages), and recovery of attorney’s fees.  Injunctive relief is also available; or, when an injunction would be inequitable, a party can seek a reasonable royalty for the unauthorized use or disclosure of a trade secret.  In order for a business to recover exemplary damages or attorney’s fees, it will need to need to demonstrate that there was a willful and malicious appropriation of the trade secret.  It should be noted, however, that in order for a business to recover exemplary damages or attorney fees against a former employee, any employment or non-disclosure agreement entered into after May 11, 2016 must advise the employee of the whistleblower and immunity protections afforded by the DTSA.

Businesses in Virginia, large and small, may invoke the DTSA to file a claim in federal court rather than pursuing a claim in state court under existing state law. Unlike Virginia state courts, federal courts allow for summary judgment on depositions and are more likely to rule on a summary judgment basis.  Furthermore, in certain circumstances, the DTSA allows plaintiffs on an ex parte basis to instruct a federal marshal to seize property “necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret.”  Because of this strong but harsh provision, it is expected that judges will be more likely to issue temporary restraining orders as an alternative remedy.

Although the DTSA does not pre-empt state law, it does protect employees in that it does not codify the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine available in some states, which doctrine allows employers to enjoin employees from working for competitors on the basis of the information the employee possesses.  Under the DTSA, an injunction against an ex-employee working for a competitor must be based on evidence of actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret.

Gross & Romanick, P.C. can help your business utilize the DTSA and similar state laws to protect against the misappropriation of trade secrets, both by preparing protective language to insert into agreements with employees, contractors and consultants, and by aggressively litigating theft claims against individuals or businesses that appropriate your trade secrets.

Distinguishing Non-Solicit Agreements from Non-Compete Agreements

Employers are justifiably concerned with protecting their businesses from competition with former employees. This is generally accomplished by requiring employees to sign agreements containing restrictive covenants. The two types of restrictive covenants that are most often utilized by employers are (1) non-solicit covenants and (2) non-compete covenants.  These two types of restrictive covenants are often blurred together, but they are distinctly different, and Virginia Courts recognize the distinction when the covenants are challenged. 

The purpose of a non-compete covenant is to prevent the former employee from generally competing with the employer in the same industry. The purpose of a non-solicit covenant is to prevent the former employee from providing services to the employer’s clients and/or hiring away the employer’s other employees.  In Virginia, non-solicit covenants are considered a species of non-compete covenants, and the same legal standard of enforceability applies to each. Since both types of covenants create a restraint on trade, neither covenant is favored in Virginia.  In all cases, a Court will evaluate the covenant in light of the circumstances of the businesses and employees involved in order to determine whether the covenant is necessary to protect the employer’s “legitimate” business interests, taking into consideration the restricted activities (i.e. the “function”), the geographic scope, and the duration of the covenant. The employer bears the burden to show that the restraint is no greater than necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, is not unduly harsh or oppressive in curtailing an employee’s ability to earn a livelihood, and is reasonable in light of sound public policy. 

While the same legal standard of enforceability applies to both types of covenants, case law shows us that Virginia Courts are more likely to enforce non-solicit covenants than they are to enforce non-compete covenants. The obvious reason is that preventing a former employee from directly poaching the employer’s existing client base and/or employees is more likely to protect that employer’s business interests than preventing the former employee from simply working for a competitor or competing for new business on the open market.  See, for example, Leddy v. Communication Consultants, Inc., 51 Va. Cir. 467 (Virginia Beach 2000), in which the Court affirmed a two year non-solicit agreement and noted that a non-solicit covenant is typically narrower in application than a non-compete covenant because it does not restrict the employee from working for a competitor.  

Even so, like non-compete covenants, non-solicit covenants must be narrowly tailored in duration and scope in order to be enforceable in Virginia. For example, in ManTech Int’l Corp. v. Analex Corp., 75 Va. Cir. 354 (Fairfax 2008), the Court struck down a six month non-solicit covenant as overbroad and ambiguous finding the phrase “the Employee shall not directly or indirectly solicit or induce any employees of ManTech to leave the employ of Mantech” not narrowly tailored to protect a legitimate business interest and unenforceable, per se, since it conceivably covers situations in which one employee convinces another to retire early, join the military or move to another state. Similarly, in Lasership, Inc. v. Watson, 79 Va. Cir. 205 (Fairfax 2009), the Court found the following two-year non-solicit covenant to be unenforceable since it prevented the employee from pursing non-competitive employment positions: “Employee shall not, for himself or on behalf of any other person, firm, corporation, or other entity, contact in any manner, directly or indirectly, solicit, agree to perform or perform any services of any type that the Company can render…for any of the Company’s Customers.”

Conversely, in Daston Corp. V. MiCore Solutions, 80 Va. Cir. 611 (Fairfax 2010), the Court upheld the enforceability of two-year non-solicit that was no broader than necessary to meet the company’s legitimate business interest.  The plain language of the covenant applied only to a “fixed universe of customers, namely those that existed during the employee’s term of employment”, a list of customers that was known to the employees being restrained, as compared to Lasership, which restriction imposed an “unreasonable burden” on the former employee to know the customers it could not solicit. 

With respect to the duration of the non-solicit covenant, there is no clear marker to distinguish enforceability.  One-year non-solicit covenants have been routinely upheld, and two-year non-solicit covenants have also been upheld with some regularity. Including a longer duration seems problematic under existing Virginia case law, and is not recommended as a practice pointer, although in 2012 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia concluded that a five year non-solicit agreement can be reasonable under Virginia law. See Capital One Fin. Corp. v. Kanas, 871 F. Supp. 2d 520.  However, a key consideration made by the Court in that matter was the nature of the business (insurance), the Court determining that the restricted period was directly related to an important element of the business (policy renewals).  

In conclusion, a non-solicit covenant is more likely to be enforced in Virginia than a non-compete covenant, even though the same legal standard applies to the Court’s analysis.  However, like non-compete covenants, non-solicit covenants must be narrowly tailored and explicitly backed up by a specific legitimate business purpose that justifies the functional restrictions and the length of the restrictive term.

Tuesday, May 3, 2016

What Happens When a Commercial Tenant Files for Bankruptcy?

In many cases, commercial tenants resort to filing for bankruptcy when they cannot pay the rental arrearage owed to the landlord and/or are struggling to pay the monthly rent as it becomes due. In some cases, the bankruptcy is filed after the landlord has commenced an eviction action under state law. The purpose of this article is to briefly summarize the landlord’s rights when this happens.

As soon as the bankruptcy case is filed, the landlord is prevented from taking any further action to recover possession of the premises or to collect the past due rent. This statutory injunction is commonly referred to as the “Automatic Stay”. The landlord must be careful not to make even casual collection attempts during the Automatic Stay, or the Bankruptcy Court may hold the landlord in contempt. 

In the bankruptcy case, the tenant has the right to reject, assume or assign the commercial lease within 120 days from the bankruptcy filing, which period can be extended by the Court for another 90 days. As a result, commercial tenants usually have 210 days to decide what to do about the lease. More often than not, the lease will be rejected because the tenant cannot afford to pay the arrearage or the monthly rent going forward. When this happens, the landlord becomes a general unsecured creditor of the bankruptcy estate, and can obtain relief from the Bankruptcy Court to proceed to recover possession of the leased space. 

In some cases, however, the tenant will want to keep the lease in place (i.e. assume the lease), or assign the lease to a third party. If the tenant elects to assume the lease, then the tenant must cure any arrearage that existed before the bankruptcy filing (i.e. “pre-petition” rent), and timely pay all rent that becomes due after the bankruptcy filing (i.e. “post-petition” rent).  If the tenant elects to assign the lease, then the tenant will be required to demonstrate to the Bankruptcy Court that the assignee is capable of performing the tenant’s obligations under the lease, and the assignee will be required to cure any arrearage and pay the rent going forward. 

Many commercial tenants file bankruptcy under the false assumption that they will be able to remain in the leased space and negotiate a better deal with the landlord going forward. Fortunately for landlords, the Bankruptcy Code does not give commercial tenants this ability (although, in some cases, the landlord may want to consider renegotiating the lease in order to keep the space occupied). Unfortunately for landlords, the filing of the bankruptcy petition usually delays the eviction of the tenant by at least two months, depending on state law and how quickly the bankruptcy estate makes a decision regarding the rejection/assumption of the lease. 

The Automatic Stay usually does not prevent the landlord from recovering possession of the leased space if the lease was terminated prior to the bankruptcy filing since there is no lease to assume, reject of assign. Accordingly, a landlord that strongly suspects an imminent bankruptcy filing should respond proactively when a tenant fails to pay rent or communicates its dire financial position to the landlord. If the landlord, in accordance with state law and the lease, is able to terminate the lease and recover possession prior to the bankruptcy filing, the landlord will improve its chances of re-letting the space without undue delay.   


This article is a very basic outline of some of the rights and obligations of tenants and landlords in bankruptcy. However, there are many nuances and complications in this area of law (e.g. rights of assignment, landlord’s administrative expenses preference, shopping center leases, and security deposits) that are beyond the scope of this article. It is essential that tenants and landlords retain experienced legal counsel to guide them through the bankruptcy process.

Ejectment - Evicting a Tenant that Claims Ownership

Most states have an expedited process to evict a residential tenant that breaches the terms of his/her lease or has no right to occupy the premises. In Virginia, this process is accomplished through an action known as an Unlawful Detainer. Typically, a landlord that wants to evict a tenant will file a Summons for Unlawful Detainer in the General District Court and, because Unlawful Detainer actions are entitled to priority on the Court’s docket, a landlord can usually get an order for possession in 30-45 days.  

A considerable problem arises when the tenant claims some type of ownership interest in the property. In Virginia, the General District Courts are considered to be “Courts Not of Record” with no authority to adjudicate title to property. Thus, the General District Courts are deprived of jurisdiction if the tenant claims to be occupying the property, not by virtue of a lease, but rather by virtue of the tenant’s ownership interest.

What is a landlord to do when a tenant no longer claims to be a tenant, but instead claims to be the owner of the property? Enter the common law ejectment action. A July, 1895 article in the Virginia Law Register by Thomas Kirkpatrick points out that an action for ejectment is over 400 years old. The Virginia Code retains the cause of action (which was litigated when the Tudor dynasty was on the English throne!) but offers no guidance as to the elements that the plaintiff must prove to prevail. One must look to the common law to determine the elements:

  1. The Plaintiff must have a subsisting interest in the property, the right to a judicial declaration of ownership and the right to recover possession; 
  2. The Defendant must be actually occupying the premises and claim an ownership interest that is adversely affected by the Plaintiff’s claim of sole and exclusive ownership; and 
  3. The Plaintiff must be dispossessed by the Defendant’s continued occupancy of the Premises.

How, you may be asking, could a tenant not named on the deed possibly claim an ownership interest the property? The first way is often the fault of the landlord: there is a mistake in the lease that creates some type of ownership interest over and above the customary occupancy interest. This scenario is easily avoided by having an experience landlord attorney prepare a proper lease. The second scenario tends to arise when the owner of the property dies and multiple parties claim ownership. Take, for example, the following case that was actually litigated by the attorneys at Gross & Romanick, P.C.:

The owner of a piece of property died intestate. His only statutory heir was his mother. However, at the time of his death, he had a long-time, live-in girlfriend. The mother tried to evict the girlfriend after probating her son’s estate, but the girlfriend claimed she was the deceased’s common law wife entitled to a statutory share of the estate (including ownership in the property). In most circumstances, this case would be easily resolved because Virginia does not recognize common law marriages. However, the girlfriend claimed that the common law marriage existed under Pennsylvania law where she and the son had lived for a period of time before coming to Virginia. Luckily for the mother, the time that the son and girlfriend had lived in Pennsylvania was too short to meet Pennsylvania’s common law marriage definition. Gross & Romanick ultimately convinced a Circuit Court judge to declare title in and award possession to the mother.  

Obviously, there is some nuance to the case that we are glossing over in this short article. This case demonstrates the importance of having a knowledgeable landlord/tenant attorney assist with any eviction proceeding, as shrewd tenants often come up with creative legal arguments to extend occupancy.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) Bites Rent Collector

In a recent case before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, a trio of residential tenants alleged that a collection agency representing their landlord violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by sending them a letter containing a demand for payment of back rent and interest allegedly owed to the landlord. See Galdamez, et. al. v. I.Q. Data International, Inc.  The tenants specifically alleged that since their lease and the Virginia Residential Landlord Tenant Act (VRLTA) did not permit the landlord to recover pre-judgment interest, the collection agency’s demand for $19.33 in interest ran afoul of the FDCPA. The tenants in the case had already vacated the property and no lawsuit had been commenced by the landlord to recover back rent. 

The collection agency filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that Virginia Code § 55-227 permits a landlord to claim interest in “any action for rent”. Judge Brinkema denied the motion and ruled in favor of the tenants, finding that the VLRTA does not contain any reference to pre-judgment interest, and that Virginia Code § 55-227 was not applicable since the VRLTA governed the case. Thus, the case will go forward to determine how much the collection agency will be sanctioned for demanding pre-judgment interest in an otherwise proper demand letter. Undoubtedly, it will be a stiff penalty for a seemingly minor oversight. 

Each violation of the FDCPA can result in statutory damages up to $1,000 per violation plus reasonable attorney’s fees. In addition, the debtor can claim damages for physical distress, emotional distress, lost wages if the debtor’s job was disrupted, and recovery of funds from a wage garnishment. The court can also impose injunctive relief, such as ordering the debt collector to cease from further communication with the debtor and the debtor’s family.

Tuesday, October 13, 2015

Garnishments and Social Security Benefits: Are New Treasury Regulations Unfair to Creditors?

In Virginia, a bank garnishment can work to seize all of the funds held in or deposited into a judgment debtor’s bank account between the date the garnishment is served and the return date specified on the garnishment. Certain monies, however, are exempt from garnishment under applicable law, including social security benefits. Historically, the burden of proof has been on the debtor, and not the bank, to identify to the court those monies in a garnished bank account that constitute exempt social security benefits. This generally required a hearing, and in some cases, bank accounts could be frozen for 60-90 days before the social security benefits could be released. Furthermore, Virginia followed a first-in-first-out rule for garnishments, meaning that social security benefits deposited into an account prior to service of the garnishment could lose protection if subsequent monies were deposited into the account and subsequent withdrawals were made. For example, if $500 of social security benefits were deposited on April 1, $500 of other income was deposited on April 2, $500 was withdrawn on April 3, and the garnishment was served on April 4, thereby seizing a total of $500, none of the garnished funds would be considered exempt. 

Recently, the U.S. Treasury Department has issued regulations (31 C.F.R. 212) that give the banks the power and the obligation to identify and protect directly deposited social security benefits. These regulations preempt state law. Now, when a bank is served with a garnishment for an account into which social security benefits are directly deposited, the bank has two days to conduct a review to determine what funds are protected. During this two-day period, the bank must provide the account holder with “full and customary access” to the protected funds. Thus, the bank must allow checks to clear and withdrawals to take place during the two-day window. The bank cannot freeze the account or it would run afoul of this “full and customary access” language.

Furthermore, if there are direct deposits of social security benefits into the account, then at least two months of social security benefits are protected regardless of when they were deposited into or withdrawn from the account (in contrast to Virginia’s first-in-first-out rule). Accordingly, in the prior example given, the entire balance of the garnished account would be considered exempt. Finally, once the bank determines the amount of the protected funds, the garnishment ends and the bank will not honor the same garnishment for additional funds deposited into the account.  This is in striking contract to Virginia law, which provides that all funds deposited into the account prior to the return date are subject to garnishment. 


The Treasury regulations attempt to balance the interests of the social security recipient, the bank, and the creditor. Without question, the regulations relieve the courts of the difficult task of identifying protected funds. However, since the creditor has no legal right to challenge the bank’s determination, and since it remains unclear how other funds in the account will be treated during the two-day review period, the initial reaction of the creditors’ bar is that the regulations are unfair. If the regulations work to give debtors an additional two-day window to withdraw unprotected funds, then without question, the regulations will negatively impact creditors.    

Docketing a Judgment in Virginia

Quite often in our newsletter articles, we reference the “docketing” of a money judgment obtained by one of our creditor clients. This article takes a step back to explain to the reader what exactly that means, as even some attorneys do not understand the concept or the process of docketing a judgment. “Docketing” is a generic terms that is used to describe the process of recording a judgment in a court of record so that the judgment may be enforced by and through that court. It should not be confused with “the docket”, which generally refers to the list of cases being handled by a court on a particular day.

The Clerk of every Circuit Court in Virginia must maintain a judgment docket book or electronic data storage system in which judgments are recorded. A judgment rendered in a particular Circuit Court in Virginia is automatically recorded in that Court’s judgment book. However, judgments obtained in other Virginia courts, including federal courts and general district courts, are not automatically recorded in every judgment book across the Commonwealth. So, for example, a judgment obtained in the City of Alexandria Circuit Court is not automatically recorded in the judgment book of the Fairfax County Circuit Court. However, every Circuit Court in Virginia permits a judgment creditor to record in its judgment book a judgment obtained in a different Virginia court. This is generally accomplished by submitting a certified abstract of judgment prepared by the court in which the judgment was rendered. The abstract is a simple summary of the judgment that identifies the parties to the underlying action and the amount of the judgment. 

The term “docketing a judgment” is also used to denote the recordation of judgments from other states and other countries (which we generically refer to as “foreign judgments”). While docketing a foreign judgment can require more procedures than docketing a Virginia judgment, if docketed properly, the foreign judgment will be enforceable through the applicable Virginia Circuit Court as if the judgment was initially rendered in that Court. Furthermore, once a judgment is docketed in a particular Circuit Court, it automatically creates a lien against any real property owned by the debtor in that city or county. It is also allows the creditor (with additional procedures) to lien and potentially seize personal property owned by the debtor that is physically located in said city or county. The totality of the benefits of docketing a foreign judgment is beyond the scope of this article.


To learn more about the collection of judgments, please contact our law firm at 703-273-1400 or send an e-mail to law@gross.com. To learn more about Gross & Romanick, visit our website at www.gross.com.

Friday, November 7, 2014

Proper LLC Tax Election May Save Money

There are many factors that a business owner must consider when deciding whether to establish an LLC or a corporation.  (See YouTube video at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_o2bPSaQRbI).  While both LLCs and corporations provide equivalent liability protection, LLCs have grown in popularity over the last decade, primarily due to the ease with which they can be organized.  In addition, unlike C-corporations, LLCs are not required to pay a separate corporate tax. 

Many business owners do not realize that an LLC can be taxed in a few different ways. In order to maximize the tax benefits of establishing an LLC, the business owner should choose the correct tax election in consultation with an experienced tax consultant.  This article is a basic summary of the different ways in which an LLC can elect to be taxed. This article is only an outline and any tax election decision should be made in consultation with an experienced tax consultant.

If the LLC does not make any tax election, then by default, a single member LLC will be treated as a “disregarded entity” for federal tax purposes, and a multi-member LLC will be classified as a “partnership” for federal tax purposes.  In such event, the LLC is not considered to be the “employer” of the member(s), and the member(s) are not considered to be “employees” of the LLC.  In lieu of the FICA payroll taxes that employees and employers of other business entities are required to pay, the members pay self-employment taxes pursuant to SECA in addition to their regular income taxes.

The LLC may avoid the default tax treatment described above if it timely chooses to be taxed as a C-corporation or as a Sub-S corporation.  (See http://www.irs.gov/publications/p3402/ar02.html).  While it does not usually make sense for an LLC to elect to be taxed as a C-corporation, since such election destroys one of the principle reasons for establishing the LLC (i.e. the avoidance of the corporate tax), it might make sense for the LLC to elect to be taxed as a Sub-S corporation.  The primary reason is that if the LLC elects to be taxed as a Sub-S corporation, then the members can be treated as employees of the LLC and pay themselves “reasonable compensation” as W2 wages subject to FICA payroll taxes (in lieu of SECA taxes).  The members can also pay themselves any remaining company profits as distributions.  In many cases, the SECA tax rate is higher than the FICA tax rate, and thus the members may save on taxes by establishing the employer/employee relationship. In addition, in most cases, the excess distributions from a Sub-S corporation to the members are not subject to FICA taxes or SECA taxes, and the members need only pay regular income taxes on such income.  Of course, the IRS carefully scrutinizers the tax treatment of sub-S corporations in order to prevent tax avoidance, and the sub-S election is not appropriate for all business owners.   

Another tax consideration for the business owner to consider is how the income, deductions, gains, losses and tax credits will be allocated to the members of a multi-member LLC.  The operating agreement of the LLC should specify this allocation.  (See YouTube video at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DiLfBzKNAeM)  While the IRS gives the LLC flexibility for such allocation, it also imposes limitations to prevent an LLC from allocating disproportionate losses to high income earners for the purpose of offsetting income from outside sources.  A Sub-S corporation is required to allocate these items consistent with ownership percentages. The members are required to have a basis in the entity in order to deduct losses currently.

In order to maximize the tax benefits of establishing an LLC, the business owner should consult with an experienced tax consultant regarding tax elections and the tax provisions of the LC's operating agreement.  Generally, an election specifying an LLC’s classification cannot take effect more than 75 days prior to the date the election is filed, nor can it take effect later than 12 months after the date the election is filed.

For assistance in organizing an LLC, contact Gross & Romanick at 703-273-1400, or contact Edward Gross directly at law@gross.com. 

This article was edited by Thomas G. Jenkins, CPA, of Thomas Jenkins and Company, P.C., whose office is located in Camp Springs, Maryland.  Thomas G. Jenkins may be contacted directly at 301-423-4474.